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Abstract
This paper provides a proof of concept for a security modelling framework to manage the
complexity of security access control in integrated systems that are emerging due to the
connectivity of the Internet. We outline a series of matrices which provide a means to
conceptually define and manage all of the various security relationships that arise in an
integrated set of systems. The security framework for integrated systems consists of two tiers.
Tier 1 is in charge of local systems. Tier 2 is in charge of overall security of an integrated
system. Then an extended tier, Tier 3, is deduced. Tier 3 is in charge of all over the Internet.
By implementing this extended three-tier security architecture, all relevant systems security is
enforced.
Keywords: Information systems, Security Modelling, Access control, Internet, Security
Matrices

1. Introduction
The impact of the Internet on the organisations in the modern economies is significant. The
networked knowledge-based economy has meant that the organisations have opened their
information systems up to the outside world to facilitate the exchange of information and
business transaction processing in real time. Systems integration over the Internet is
becoming increasingly important for industry specific applications such as supply chain
management (SCM), customer relationship management (CRM), procurement and the need
for business partners to access and exchange information between ERP (Enterprise Resource
Planning) systems. Therefore it is not surprising that system integration (Hearst 1988; Bolcer
and Taylor 1996; Hasselbring 2000; Ball, Ma et al. 2002), including data integration (Yong
and Yang 2003), tool integration (Yong and Yang 2003), and process integration (Yong and
Yang 2001), has become a hot research topic.
However, little practical research has been conducted on security issues raised by systems
integration over the Internet. In particular, one aspect of systems security, ‘access control’,
which is a relatively simple function to administer for a single system, becomes incredibly
complex to administer when beginning to integrate systems over the Internet. As we all know
that it is relatively easy to define secure access control for an individual computer or even a
simple computer system. For example, a computer can easily be set up to control the access
based on user’s name and password. For a simple system, users can be divided into different
groups and different groups will have different access privileges. However for a complex
integrated system, especially one connected by the Internet, it is not easy to manage its secure
access control across a range of potentially dispersed systems. At the same time, because
integrated systems are being used to conduct significant business activities over the Internet,
security has become a priority.
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The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, 20 top Internet-based security
vulnerabilities are introduced. In Section 3, traditional access control mechanisms are
addressed. In Section 4, the new access requirements are addressed for integrated systems. In
Section 5, detailed security matrices for access control are presented. In Section 6, a new
security framework for access control is illustrated. In Section 7, an extended three-tier
framework is deduced for all Internet-based systems. In Section 8, conclusions are drawn.

2. Top 20 Internet Security Vulnerabilities
It is common that most computers, which connect to the Internet, run either Microsoft
Windows or Unix/Linux. It is important to know the vulnerabilities for Windows and
Unix/Linux respectively. The next two subsections briefly introduce top ten vulnerabilities
for Windows and top ten vulnerabilities for Unix/Linux separately. The details appear at
SANS’s top twenty vulnerabilities(SANS 2004)
2.1 Top Ten Unix/Linux Vulnerabilities
This section addresses the top ten vulnerabilities for Unix/ Linux systems.
1. DNS (Domain Name Service): DNS is a system which allows the conversion of
hostnames (e.g. www.usq.edu.au) into the registered IP addresses. This vulnerability
is mostly caused by a software package, Called BIND (Berkeley Internet Name
Domain). The ubiquity and critical nature of BIND has made it a frequent target for
attackers to launch a DoS (Denial of Service) attack or other malicious activities.
2. RPC (Remote Procedure Calls): RPCs allow programs on one computer to execute
procedures on another computer by passing data and retrieving the results. Because
these RPC services can execute with elevated privileges that lead to a vulnerability for
an attacker to launch malicious activities in other computers.
3. Apache web server: An Apache server is used to provide the web service to all web
browsers. All potential vulnerabilities (e.g. SQL, CGI, PHP, etc.) are exposed to the
outside through the web server.
4. General Unix/Linux authentication accounts with no passwords or weak passwords:
All the usages of Unix/Linux systems are related to passwords. Any accounts with on
passwords or weak passwords will become a potential security hole for that system.
Thus a good password policy needs to be implemented to minimize system
vulnerabilities.
5. Clear text services: Because Unix/Linux systems use plain text to conduct network
services; it allows everybody who is sniffing network to gain access to either
communication contents and/or authentication credentials.
6. Sendmail: Sendmail is the program that sends, receives, and forwards most electronic
mail processed on Unix/Linux systems. Sendmail is one of the most popular mail
transfer agent and its widespread use on the Internet has made it a prime target of
attackers.
7. SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol): SNMP is used to monitor and
configure almost all types of TCP/IP-enabled devices. SNMP communication consists
of different types of exchange management messages, which leave significant
vulnerabilities when these messages are handled.
8. SSH (Secure Shell): SSH is a popular service for securing logins, command execution,
and file transfers across a network. It allows an attacker to exploit holes to obtain root
access on a vulnerable computer.
9. Misconfiguration of enterprise services NIS/NFS: NIS and NFS are the network file
system and network information service. They are two important services used in
Unix networks. The security problems with NIS/NFS are related to buffer overflows,
DoS and weak authentication.
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10. Open SSL (Secure Sockets Layer): The Open-source OpenSSL library is a popular
package to add cryptographic security to applications that communicate over the
network. Because OpenSSL is used by most programs/applications for security
concerns. Thus if OpenSSL has any vulnerabilities, the attackers will use them to
attack the programs/applications which rely on OpenSSL.
2.2 Top Ten Windows Vulnerabilities
This section lists the top ten vulnerabilities for Windows.
1. IIS (Internet Information Services): IIS has similar functions as the Apache server of
Unix/Linux. Through the web server, the attackers can launch different attacks, such
as denial of service, exposure or compromise of sensitive files or data, execution of
arbitrary commands, complete compromise of the server, etc.
2. MSSQL (Microsoft SQL Server): MSSQL contains several serious vulnerabilities that
allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information, alter database content,
compromise SQL servers, and, in some configurations, compromise server hosts.
3. Windows authentication: this is more related to password vulnerabilities. Although
Microsoft Windows does not store or transmit passwords in clear text – it uses a hash
of password for authentication. The mathematical algorithms which are used by
Windows can be cracked down by attackers through brute-force or social engineering.
Then it becomes a security hole.
4. IE (Internet Explorer): Microsoft IE is the default we browser installed on Microsoft
Windows platforms. All existing versions of IE have critical vulnerabilities if they are
not kept up-to-date with current patches. The attackers can use IE to takeover the
vulnerable system.
5. Windows remote access services: Like NETBIOS network shares, anonymous logon
null sessions, remote registry access, and remote procedure calls, these items make up
a large share of the more common network level exploits on windows. The attackers
can use these items to obtain access to vulnerable computers.
6. MDAC (Microsoft Data Access Components): MDAC can bring vulnerabilities to
Windows platform computer through database components to run malicious
commands and code on attacked computers.
7. WSH (Windows Scripting Host): WSH is a Microsoft technology that serves to extend
the functionality of Windows, supporting both JavaScript and Visual Basic Script.
WSH will affect vulnerable computers via web components (e.g. IE ) to control
Windows operating systems.
8. Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express: Outlook and Outlook Express will leave
vulnerabilities over their mail server and client. This gives the attackers to spread email viruses, worms, malicious code to compromise the local system.
9. P2P (Windows Peer-to-Peer files sharing): P2P file sharing system are used
extensively by a rapidly growing user based. These applications are used to download
and distribute different types of data (e.g. video, audio, graphics, and proprietary
information). P2P communication consists of requests, replies, and file transfers,
which bring relevant systems vulnerabilities.
10. SNMP: this vulnerability is the same as the Unix/Linux. After the vulnerabilities of
SNMP are found, the attackers can use them to attach relevant network devices,
computers, and their operating platforms.

3. Access Control in Systems Security
From previous section, the top twenty vulnerabilities have brought a big trouble to the
Internet and its applications. Through a careful analysis, we found most of the top twenty
vulnerabilities can be controlled by implementing an effective access control policy.
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Traditionally Role-based Access Control (RBAC) is frequently used by many organisations to
implement their security strategy. Bacon, Moody and Yao (2002) has described a model of
RBAC by OASIS(Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards).
OASIS published a role-based access control architecture for achieving secure interoperation
of services in an open, distributed environment; the aim of OASIS is to allow autonomous
management domains to specify their own access control policies and to interoperate subject
to service level agreements. Services define roles and implement formally specified policy to
control role activation and service use; users must present the required credentials, in an
appropriate context, in order to activate a role or invoke a service. All privileges are derived
from roles, which are activated for the duration of a session only. In addition, a role is
deactivated immediately if any of the conditions of the membership rule associated with its
activation becomes false. These conditions can test the context, thus ensuring active
monitoring of security. To support the management of privileges, OASIS introduces
appointment. Users in certain roles are authorized to issue other users with appointment
certificates, which may be a prerequisite for activating one or more roles. The conditions for
activating a role at a service may include appointment certificates as well as prerequisite roles
and constrains on the context. An appointment certificate does not therefore convey privileges
directly but can be used as a credential for role activation. Role-based access control, in
associating privileges with roles, provides a means of expressing access control that is
scalable to large numbers of principals.
Other access control methods include Temporal Role-based access control (TRBAC)(Bertino,
Bettini et al. 2000), Team-based Access Control (TBAC) (Georgiadis, Mavridis et al. 2001),
Generalized Role-based Access Control (GRBAC) (Covington, Moyer et al. 2000). TRBAC
introduces periodic activation and deactivation, and role triggers for expressing temporal
dependencies. Periodic activation and deactivation support time-limited authorization. TMAC
is directly associated with a team, which is a group of users in specific roles, collaboratively
working on a common task, the privileges that a user has are determined by his/her current
team. GRBAC extends traditional RBAC by introducing object roles and environment roles
in addition to subject roles. An object role represents a facet of the requested object. These
roles are activated automatically by the system. The access control only can satisfy the
classification of users and services statically. When integration of heterogeneous systems is
required, how can the access control policies be achieved actively? This issue is discussed in
later sections.

4. The New Access Control Requirements for Integrated Systems
Before integration of a set of potentially quite different systems in terms of users needs and
security, the access control requirements for users that will need to access other individual
systems within the set of integrated systems needs to be established. It is important to
establish the desired level of access control for each system for individual users. Otherwise,
in large set of integrated systems, the number of individual users could be exponentially quite
large resulting in performance issues. An in-depth requirements analysis of user access needs
in the integrated set of systems is required. This will allow the systems administrator to
determine the access rights for each individual in the integrated system. An integrated system
will consist of a large number of individual systems, which actually implement their own
access control policies separately. After integration, some systems might need to access other
systems for cooperation, which requires a mechanism to look after all individual systems as a
whole to ensure the system security. Some research has addressed aspects of these
requirements. Riet & Janssen (Riet, Janssen et al. 1998)identified database security from
database systems to ERP systems,. Olivier (Olivier, Riet et al. 1998) addressed applicationlevel security for workflow systems, and Soshi & Maekawa(Soshi and Maekawa 1997) dealt
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with security architecture for open distributed systems. They all discussed security issues
from certain aspects of system integration, but they did not deal with the overall requirements
from the perspective of system integration. In particular, none addressed access control for an
integrated system. Following sections will address how that mechanism can be achieved and
provide a proof of concept.

5. Security Modelling Matrices for Integrated Systems
Assume there are n systems, which will be integrated. We represent these systems as S1, S2,
S3, …, Sn. S1has n1 internal users, m1 groups and p1 privileges. S2 has n2 internal users, m2
groups and p2 privileges. S3 has n3 internal users, m3 groups and p3 privileges. Sn has nn
internal users, gn groups and pn privileges. Now for the integrated system, the number of
internal users is a sum of all respective systems’ internal user number: n1+n2+n3+…+nn.
What privileges should the integrated system have? It is obvious that all the privileges in the
individual system should be included in the integrated system. Thus for the integrated system,
privileges P will be defined as:
Pi represents the privileges of individual system i.
P= U Pi 1<=i<=n
Next design different groups for the integrated system. Each group will be assigned relative
privileges from P. These groups will operate all the individual systems in the same way. If a
user belongs to one of these groups, then the user can get all privileges, which that group has
been given, to operate on all available resources within the integrated system. For example,
suppose there is a group which is responsible for web services. Now assume there are several
users in this group. This group will have all authorities to operate on any web servers within
an integrated system. Now any user from this group can operate on any web server within the
integrated system. From this example, we can know that these groups exist beyond an
individual system.
In other words, there is a need to know how integrated system security policies effectively
cooperate with all previous individual security policies. The following security model for
system integration is proposed: Two-tier security architecture for a large integrated system to
enhance its overall security.
5.1 Tier 2 Security of the Integrated Systems
Tier 2 is concerned with the integrated system which has an overall security view for all
integrated systems. The relationships of security elements in the integrated system are as
follows (Yong, Lane et al. 2003).
Relationship 1 (R1), for users and systems, express this relationship as R1(U×S). U is a set
of all the users, U1,U2, …, Un, in the integrated system. S is a set of individual autonomous
systems, S1, S2, S3, …, Sn. Ui is a set of users in autonomous Si, while 1<=i<=n.
Relationship 2 (R1), for groups and systems, express this relationship as R2 (G×S). G is a set
of all the groups,G1, G2, G3, …, Gn, in the integration system. S is a set of individual
autonomous systems, S1, S2, S3, …, Sn. Gi is a set of groups in system Si, while 1<=i<=n.
Relationship 3 (R3), for privileges and users, express this relationship as R3(P×U). P is a set
of all the privileges, P1, P2, P3, …, Pn, in the integrated system. U is a set of all the users in
the integrated system. Pi is a set of the privileges in autonomous system Si, while 1<=i<=n.
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Relationship 4 (R4), for privileges and groups, express this relationship as R4(P×G). P is a
set of all the privileges in the integrated system. G is a set of all the groups in the integration
system.
Relationship 5 (R5), for groups and users, express this relationship as R5(G×U). G is a set of
all the groups in the integration system. U is a set of all the users in the integrated system.
Relationship 6 (R6), for privileges and systems, express this relationship as R6(P×S). P is a
set of all the privileges in the integrated system. S is a set of individual autonomous systems.
Next the relationships R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R6 and their contribution to the overall
security concerns for the integrated system are analysed.
R1 is used to express the relationship with all the users within the integrated system and all
the individual autonomous systems. The following matrix (Figure 1) illustrates the number of
users and autonomous individual systems.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 …… … Sn
U1
U2
U3
U4
U5
U6
..
Un

⎛ N 11 N 12 N13 N14 N 15 N16 ............N 1n ⎞
⎟
⎜
⎜ N 21 N 22 N 23 N 24 N 25 N 26 ...........N 2 n ⎟
⎟
⎜ N N N N N N ...........N
3n
⎟
⎜ 31 32 33 34 35 36
⎜ N 41 N 42 N 43 N 44 N 45 N 46 ...........N 4 n ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜ ....................................................... ⎟
⎜ N N N N N N ...........N ⎟
nn ⎠
⎝ n1 n 2 n 3 n 4 n 5 n 6

Figure 1 Matrix R1 presents the number of users and autonomous individual systems
The value of Nkj is the number of users of Uj who become legal users of Sk through system
integration.
From this matrix, the exact number of users for the overall system and all individual systems
is available. It is very useful for each individual system to know its legal users after system
integration and to provide the secure access for these users. From this matrix, we know the
integrated system has the following number of users:
n

Total user number (Tu)=

∑ Nii
i =1

Actually Nii is the original number of users of Si before system integration. Now the exact
number of users for each individual autonomous system after system integration can be
calculated. Ni is the number of users of Si after system integration. The following equation
gives the number of users for any individual system.
n
(1 ≤ i ≤ n )
Ni= Nji

∑
j =1
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Now a new access control table for each individual autonomous system over the whole
integrated system is available. When any user wants to access an individual system, if the
user is not an original user of this system, this system will send a request to consult this
outside access control table; if the user is listed in this outside access table, then the user can
access this system and use its authorised resources. Otherwise the user will be denied access
to this system.
R2 is the relationship between all the groups within the integrated system and all the
individual autonomous systems. This relationship can be expressed by a matrix similar to R1.
From this matrix (Figure 2), there follows two equations:
the number groups of the integrated system
n

Total group number (Tg)=

∑ Mii
i =1

Any individual autonomous (Si) system will have the following number (Mi) of groups after
the system integration.
n
(1 ≤ i ≤ n )
Mi= Mji

∑
j =1

Based on this matrix, an access control table for the whole integrated system can be
established. At the same time any individual autonomous system will have an expanded
access control table to control group access especially for groups which are not its original
groups.

S1 S2 S3
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6.

Gn

S4

S5

S6 …… …Sn

⎛ M 11 M 12 M 13 M 14 M 15 M 16 ............M 1n ⎞
⎟
⎜
⎜ M 21 M 22 M 23 M 24 M 25 M 26 ...........M 2 n ⎟
⎜ M M M M M M ...........M ⎟
3n ⎟
⎜ 31 32 33 34 35 36
⎜ M 41 M 42 M 43 M 44 M 45 M 46 ...........M 4 n ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜ ....................................................... ⎟
⎜ M M M M M M ...........M ⎟
nn ⎠
⎝ n1 n 2 n 3 n 4 n 5 n 6

Figure 2 Matrix R2 is the number of groups for the integrated systems
The value of Mkj is the number of groups of Gj who become legal groups of Sk through
system integration.
R3 is the relation of privileges and users from an individual autonomous system. The
following matrix (Figure 3) can be used to illustrate the relationship.
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U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 ……
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6

Pn

…Un

⎛W11W12W13W14W15W16 ...................W1n ⎞
⎟
⎜
⎜W21W22W23W24W25W26 .................W2 n ⎟
⎜W W W W W W .................W ⎟
3n ⎟
⎜ 31 32 33 34 35 36
⎜W41W42W43W44W45W46 .................W4 n ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜ ....................................................... ⎟
⎜W W W W W W .................W ⎟
nn ⎠
⎝ n1 n 2 n 3 n 4 n 5 n 6

Figure 3 Matrix R3 is the relation of privileges and users from a whole individual
autonomous system
Based on this relationship, Wij is 0 or 1 in this matrix, if Wij =0, then all the privileges (Pi)
from the ith autonomous system (Si) can not apply to any of the users from the jth
autonomous system (Sj). If Wij =1, then all the privileges (Pi) from the ith autonomous
system (Si) can apply to all the users from the jth autonomous system (Sj). From this matrix,
it is obvious that Wij =1 ( 1<=i<=n). Based on this matrix, one autonomous system’s
privileges can be obtained by all the users from another autonomous system. Furthermore a
matrix can be expanded to include all of the privileges and all the users in the integrated
system.
R4 is the relationship between the privileges and groups. It can be expressed by a matrix
(Figure 4), which is quite similar to R3. The matrix is as follows.

g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 …..………gTg
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6

.
Pn

⎛V11V12V13V14V15V16 ...................V1Tg ⎞
⎟
⎜
⎜V21V22V23V24V25V26 .................V2Tg ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜V31V32V33V34V35V36 .................V3Tg ⎟
⎟
⎜V V V V V V .................V
4Tg
⎟
⎜ 41 42 43 44 45 46
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎜ .......................................................⎟
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜V V V V V V .................V
nTg ⎠
⎝ n1 n 2 n 3 n 4 n 5 n 6

Figure 4 Matrix R4 is the relationship between the privileges and groups
Tg is the total number of groups in the integrated system. If Vij (1<=i<=n & 1<=j<=Tg)=0,
the jth group can not obtain all of the privileges which the ith system has. If Vij=1, the jth
group gets all the privileges which the ith system has. This matrix can be used to implement
the group access within the integrated system.
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R5 is the relationship between all the users and all the groups in the integrated system. The
following matrix (Figure 5) is a representation.

g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 …..………gTg
u1
u2
u3
u4
u5
u6
.
.
.
uTu

⎛V11V12V13V14V15V16 ...................V1Tg ⎞
⎟
⎜
⎜V21V22V23V24V25V26 .................V2Tg ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜V31V32V33V34V35V36 .................V3Tg ⎟
⎟
⎜V V V V V V .................V
4Tg
⎟
⎜ 41 42 43 44 45 46
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜ ...................................................... ⎟
⎜ ....................................................... ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎜V V V V V V ...............V ⎟
Tu
1
Tu
2
Tu
3
Tu
4
Tu
5
Tu
6
TuTg
⎠
⎝

Figure 5 Matrix R5 is the relationship between all the users and all the groups in the
integrated system
If Vij (1<=i<=Tu & 1<=j<=Tg)=0, the jth group does not include the ith user as its member.
If Vij = 1, the jth group includes the ith user as its member. The matrix gives exact members
for each group. All the privileges which a group has will automatically be given to all its
members.
R6 is the relationship between the privileges and individual autonomous systems. It can be
represented by the following matrix (Figure 6).
S1 S2
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6

.
Pn

S3 S4 S5 S6 …..…… … Sn

⎛ X 11 X 12 X 13 X 14 X 15 X 16 ................... X 1n ⎞
⎟
⎜
⎜ X 21 X 22 X 23 X 24 X 25 X 26 ................. X 2 n ⎟
⎜ X X X X X X ................. X ⎟
3n ⎟
⎜ 31 32 33 34 35 36
⎜ X 41 X 42 X 43 X 44 X 45 X 46 ................. X 4 n ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ ......................................................
⎟
⎜ ......................................................
⎟
⎜
⎜ ....................................................... ⎟
⎜ X X X X X X ................. X ⎟
nn ⎠
⎝ n1 n 2 n 3 n 4 n 5 n 6

Figure 6 Matrix R6 is the relationship between the privileges and individual autonomous
systems
Based on this relationship,

Xij

equals 0 or 1 in this matrix. If

Xij =0, all the privileges (Pi)

from the ith autonomous system (Si) cannot apply to the jth autonomous system (Sj). If Xij =1,
all the privileges (Pi) from the ith autonomous system (Si) can apply to the jth autonomous
system (Sj). From this matrix, it is obvious that
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Xij =1 ( 1<=i<=n). Based on this matrix, one

autonomous system’ privileges can be obtained by another autonomous system. All six
relationships (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R6) can operate with each other to form a new control
access policy. Sometimes these relationships can be optimized to reduce the overhead on
system performance of this security architecture. This issue will be dealt with in future
research.
5.2 Tier1 Security of Individual Autonomous System
This tier deals with security policies of individual autonomous systems. Thus different
systems will have quite different security policies. These policies are based on various rolebased access controls in the internal system. Most individual systems distinguish their legal
users or groups by the userIDs/groupIDs as well as the passwords from unauthorised
users/groups. In Tier 1, security policies only deal with users, groups and privileges, which
are related to defined roles.

6. Two-tier security policy framework for an Integrated System
The security of an integrated system is divided into two tiers. Tier 1 is in charge of individual
autonomous systems. Tier 2 is in charge of the whole integrated system. This relationship can
be illustrated in Figure 7.

Tier 2
policies

Overall security policies

Sn security policies

S6 security policies

S5 security policies

S4 security policies

S3 security policies

S2 security policies

S1 security policies

Tier 1
policies

Figure 7 Logical security policies of an integrated system

From Figure 7, security policies can be implemented. First, if a user or a group wants to
access any local system (S1, S2, S3, …, Sn), assume it is S1, and also the user or group
belongs to S1, then this user or group will only be checked by S1 security policies, which
only relate to Tier 2’s polices. This is exactly the same as prior to the system integration.
Second, suppose, a user or a group belongs to S1, and wants to access any other systems (S2,
S3, …, Sn), assume the user or group will access S3. Table 3 shows appropriated steps for
this situation:
Table 1 Steps required to determine if an individual system user can access another system
within an integrated set of systems using the Tier 2 security architecture
Steps Actions
1
S3 finds that the user or the group is not one of its local users or groups.
2
S3 sends a request to the security server which is in charge of security policies of the
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3

integrated system.
Based on the responses from the security server in Tier 2, S3 will know what
privileges can be granted to that user or group.
S3 will allow the access to the user or group according to its privileges or reject the
access to the user or group because the user or group cannot be authenticated by this
higher hierarchical security server, which implements the security policies at Tier 2.

Thus for a whole integrated system, the security policies are divided into Tiers 1 and 2.
Sometimes Tier 1 can satisfy the security requirements alone. Sometimes Tier 1 needs the
cooperation of Tier 2 to satisfy the security requirements to allow non-local users/groups to
access a local system. Through this two tiers’ security mechanism, a robust security system
has been established for an integrated system so that all the individual autonomous systems
cannot only keep their original security properties but also flexibly accept access from outside
their integrated business partners.

7. Three-Tier Security Policy for Internet-Based Systems
In the previous two sections, a two-tier framework is well designed to enforce the security of
an integrated system from the perspective of access control. After an integrated system is
formed, this integrated system will become one part of the Internet. It is necessary to have a
clear security policy for the Internet and its integrated subsystems. The overall security policy
needs to have three tiers: Tier 1 for each individual local system, Tier 2 for an integrated
system, Tier 3 for the Internet as a whole. Figure 8 illustrates this three-tier framework for
Internet-based systems.

Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3

Figure 8 Relationships of three tiers for Internet-based systems

From Figure 8, we should have following expressions for the relationships between Tier1,
Tier 2 and Tier 3.
Tier 3 ⊆ Tier 2 ⊆ Tier1

It means that all the security policies at Tier 3 should also be considered by and be transferred
to Tier 2’s security policies, all the security policies at Tier 2 should be considered by and be
transferred to Tier 1’s security policies. That will ensure all systems (e.g. individual local
systems, integrated systems, the Internet as a whole) more secure and have a consistent
security policy for all systems. In the previous sections, Tier 3 should cover all the security
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policies which tackle vulnerabilities of Section 2. Tier 2 should cover all the security policies
of Sub-section 5.1. Tier 1 should cover all the security polices of Sub-section 5.2.

8. Conclusions
A mathematical proof of concept for the security requirements of an integrated system has
been presented. According to requirements of system integration, it is concluded that six
relationships (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6), which correlate all the security requirements of
individual autonomous systems (S) in a set of integrated systems, users (U), groups (G), and
privileges (P). Based on these six relationships, a two-tiered security architecture for an
integrated system is proposed, which can often be a large scale system integrated over the
Internet to service the purpose of E-Commerce. This two-tiered security architecture ensures
that the overall integrated system has a very reliable security policy and at the same time each
individual autonomous system keeps its original security properties to service to its local
users/groups but also utilises Tier 2’s function to service all others user within the integrated
system. Through this combination of tier1 and tier 2, the whole integrated system’s security
can be effectively implemented and at the same time any individual system’s security can also
be reinforced. After an integrated system merges into the Internet, an extended three-tier
security policy is deduced to make all Internet-based systems more secure.
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